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Large Energy Projects and Community Benefits 
Agreements —some experience from the UK 
 
Abstract 
 
Large projects are often controversial projects, with wide ranging implications for host 
localities. Energy projects, including windfarms, nuclear power stations, and the more 
recent cases of fracking and nuclear waste geological disposal, provide particularly 
high profile cases. In response to concern there has been the emergence of a whole 
family of new procedures, processes and methods for their assessment and 
management, including the advent of Community Benefit Agreements (CBAs). This 
article examines some of the critical issues around the increasing use of such 
agreements, including: their justification, relationship to the planning process, scale of 
benefits (which can be very large), types of benefits, and their management and 
distribution. The focus is on emerging UK practice in relation to energy projects, but 
there will also be reference to some relevant practice elsewhere—especially in the EU 
and North America.  
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1. Large energy projects in context 
The progress or otherwise of big projects, and their associated impacts, tend to be 
headline news topics in many countries. Such projects can include manufacturing, 
services and especially infrastructure activities and these often involve special decision 
making procedures. For example, in the UK, the 2008 Planning Act identifies a set of 
Nationally Significant Infrastructure Projects (NSIPs) in the fields of energy, transport, 
water, waste water and waste (HMG 2008). The projects vary in size; some are ‘mega 
projects’ costing billions, covering large areas, employing many thousands of people 
usually in construction, and invariably controversial. These are often the sort of projects 
for which the acronym LULU (locally unacceptable land uses) was coined several 
decades ago in the USA. The projects have wide-ranging impacts, both bio-physical 
and socio-economic. 
To address such impacts, we have witnessed the evolution of a whole family of 
procedures, processes and methods of assessment and-management. These include of 
course the widening impact assessment (IA) family-EIA/SIA/SEA/SA/HIA/HRA/EqIA¹-
and many others. They sometimes include special procedures for subsets of major 
projects, as noted in the UK above, with a project examination system operated by the 
National Infrastructure Division of the Planning Inspectorate (PINS). PINS provides a 
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good set of guidance documents on aspects of the planning and assessment process 
for major projects (PINS, 2012-2017).They may also include special arrangements for 
potential major project host authorities, such as the UK Planning Performance 
Agreements (PPAs), through which the developer provides often substantial funding to 
enable host local authorities to better critically assess the potential local impacts of the 
project (DCLG 2015). 
There are also Community Benefit Agreements (CBAs) ². The term refers to those  
agreements between the various stakeholders involved in a project, in particular 
between the developer and the host community, which can provide a range of benefits, 
including financial incentives, infrastructure, and community empowerment measures.  
In many respects it is synonymous with the term Community Benefit Schemes, which is 
also used in practice. There are various arguments for CBAs, most recently that they 
are offered not to compensate for projected impacts, but in recognition of the 
community’s participation in an activity that is perceived as being ‘in the national 
interest’. Additionally for many large projects there are always likely to be some indirect 
disturbance effects and changes in lifestyle which are less easy to address directly. 
CBAs are becoming a growing element in the assessment and development of major 
projects, especially energy projects, in the UK and internationally. 
The aim of this article is to explore the evolving nature of CBAs, and the issues they 
raise with particular reference to contemporary energy projects in the UK. These 
projects include large windfarms (on-shore and off-shore), gas fired power stations, a 
new generation of nuclear power stations, plus the associated search for a nuclear 
waste geological disposal facility, and fracking for shale gas. The focus on energy 
projects, primarily in the UK, reflects the substantial activity on such projects in recent 
years; many of the projects are controversial. There has also been a diverse and 
evolving experience of the use of CBAs, from early use in on-shore wind farm projects 
to contemporary proposals for major nuclear power projects and the storage of nuclear 
waste. The article employs a number of analytical lenses: (1) an evolutionary lens 
reviewing changes in the use of CBAs for large energy projects in the UK over 
approximately the last 15 years; (2) a wide-angled lens exploring a broader range of 
energy technologies, and cross-technology comparisons, from the early use of CBAs for 
onshore wind farms, plus early work on the management of radioactive waste, to the 
application to a much wider range of energy projects; and (3) a limited international lens 
drawing on some comparative experiences from a number of other countries.  
The article builds from a core of relevant research and practice particularly in relation to 
community benefits and on-shore wind projects (see in particular CSE 2005, 2007; 
Walker and Cass 2007; Aitken 2010; Cowell, Bristow and Munday 2011), and to 
community benefits and the management of radioactive waste (see in particular 
COWAM 2009, Argona 2010, Richardson 2010). It adds further findings from more 
recent CBA research across the various energy technologies, plus material from 
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practice from particular energy developments and industry groups, and from the 
evolving local and national policy contexts. It seeks to explore the evolving nature of 
Community Benefit Agreements in relation to a number of key issues.   
After an outline of the employed research approach (section 2), the following sections 
(3-7) explore some key issues associated with the use of CBAs. This starts with an 
examination of the justification for such measures, and a consideration of potential 
confusion of role in relation to project mitigation measures. Once the justification has 
been established for a CBA in relation to a particular project, a whole raft of CBA 
operational issues follow. What constitutes a fair and reasonable scale of community 
benefits, over what period of time, in relation to a particular project? What types of 
benefits are possible? Who controls CBAs, and how are they managed in practice? 
How are benefits to be distributed -- to whom and when? Scale issues are controversial, 
encompassing conflicting and increasingly rising expectations, plus issues of 
consistency and comparison within and between energy project types. The nature of 
possible benefits is widening from an initial focus on financial incentives and 
infrastructure to an inclusion of more social and community empowerment measures. 
Distributional issues can also be controversial; who decides and what are the 
operational criteria for distribution? For example what are the roles of the developer and 
local agencies in managing the process; what is the distributional balance between the 
local and wider regional communities? The article seeks to explore the key CBA issues 
across the various energy sub-sectors, across larger and smaller projects, exploring 
areas of cross relevance, of similarities and differences. 
There is a focus on evolving practice in the UK energy sector and its sub-sectors. The 
aim is to highlight good practice where appropriate, but also to note some fuzzy and 
contentious areas. Where applicable, there is also reference to some international 
comparative experience on the CBA issue, noting in particular EU experience, but also 
considering practice elsewhere, for example in North America. The final section (8) 
considers the future role of CBAs, their significance especially for major project 
developments, but also the importance of handling with care some of the key issues 
raised here.  
 
2. Research approach: scoping the range of contemporary UK major 
energy projects and CBAs 
The article draws on several approaches to the scoping of the range of relevant UK 
energy related projects and community benefit agreements. A Google search of key 
words over the period 2001 to mid-2016 sets the wider range to the scoping exercise. 
This is reinforced by the author’s own knowledge of relevant projects drawing on 
academic and consultancy work on major energy projects in the UK and overseas over 
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the last 30 years. A final and contemporary sieve is provided by an examination of those 
major energy projects which have been examined under the national infrastructure 
regime established by the 2008 Planning Act. In all cases there is a focus on those 
projects which have been completed, or are under construction, or have been approved 
for development. Whilst the article does not claim to include coverage of all large energy 
projects in the UK over the last 15 years, it does aim to identify from the range of cases 
considered some emerging trends across the energy sector and its sub-sectors. This 
project focus is complemented by an examination of relevant local and national 
government and/or industry policy and guidance on community benefits for energy 
projects.  
The Google search on ‘UK energy projects and community benefit agreements’ 
emphasises the predominance of work in the on-shore wind energy industry, and 
especially in Scotland. Other energy sectors are minor in comparison, with some limited 
mention of off-shore wind, solar farm projects, and nuclear. A more targeted search on 
particular energy sub-sectors notes nuclear, especially Hinkley Point C, and evolving 
policy around nuclear waste disposal and fracking. There is little or no mention of CBAs 
for fossil-fuelled plants, including the burgeoning array of Combined Cycle Gas Turbine 
(CCGT) projects in the UK, which is a little surprising given that such projects are 
generally seen as less environmentally benign than renewables.  
The search of energy projects under the 2008 national infrastructure regime (PINS 
website at September 2016) revealed, of the 38 decided projects, a preponderance of 
large off-shore wind farms, especially in the North Sea, several CCGT plants, and 
various grid/pipeline projects. On-shore windfarms are limited to a few projects in 
Wales; there is also Hinkley Point C nuclear, Swansea Bay tidal, and a biomass project. 
The explicit CBA content in the documentation of these projects is limited; partly as 
such content is not a material consideration in the planning process. However, outwith 
the planning applications and decisions on these projects, there is some evidence of an 
increasing role for CBAs, especially for large off-shore wind farms, although this is still 
limited compared to the previously noted content on on-shore wind farms, especially in 
Scotland. Again there is little of note for CCGT projects, perhaps reflecting that the 
development of such projects in the UK has been less locally contentious.     
 
3. Justification for CBAs 
 
What is the justification for having CBAs at all? Views can be typified between the 
extremes of the altruistic where developer philanthropy meets community interests to 
the cynical and highly sceptical of CBAs as developer bribes to effectively buy a 
planning consent. Views also vary between different national contexts. Advocated 
reasons for CBAs have also evolved over time. Views on justification can also vary 
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substantially between stakeholders involved in particular projects. Developers prefer to 
talk much more about positive motives, being a good neighbour and corporate social 
responsibility rather than paying compensation (Cass et al 2010). 
Overall this is quite a fuzzy area, with overlapping motives including for example: being 
good neighbours, sharing rewards, supporting community engagement, providing 
compensation, and delivering fair reparations. Cowell et al (2011) talk of ‘constructive 
ambiguity’ in relation to their study of on-shore wind farms in Wales, ‘in which fluidity of 
meaning allows the concept to hold together a range of interests’. In addition, there has 
been an overlapping of CBA roles in some cases with what one might expect to be 
covered through the normal planning and environmental assessment and decision 
making process.  
 
Evolving and varied international context   
The USA was an early pioneer and provides examples of quite a wide definition and 
rationale for CBAs in relation to a range of project types, much wider than energy 
projects. For example Gross et al (2002) defines a CBA as: 
---a legally enforceable contract, signed by community groups and by a developer, 
setting forth a range of community benefits that the developer agrees to provide as part 
of a development project. A CBA is the result of a negotiation process between the 
developer and organised representatives of affected communities, in which the 
developer agrees to shape the development in a certain way or to provide specified 
community benefits. In exchange, the community group promises to support the 
proposed project before government bodies that provide the necessary permits and 
subsidies. The CBA is both a process to work towards these mutually beneficial 
objectives, and a mechanism to enforce both sides’ promises.   
In similar vein, Baxamusa (2008) defines a CBA as:  
-- a private agreement between a community coalition and the developer on multiple 
issues that may or may not be included in the regular planning process. The CBA is 
different from other private agreements in that it is between a developer and a coalition 
of multiple community groups with plural interests. 
Here CBAs are seen as valuable in shifting the traditional antagonistic relationship 
between developer and public towards a more deliberative relationship. Their use has 
spread across the USA in the last 10 years or so - from the initial pioneering Los 
Angeles’ examples (eg Lakers stadium/LA, Los Angeles Airport Expansion (LAX)) 
(Baxamusa 2008) to major energy projects (see for example the CBA for Salem Harbor 
CCGT project, City of Salem 2014). But it can be argued that in many US cases CBAs 
are substituting for measures which should be normal mitigation and/or enhancement 
measures for major projects, and are distorting the planning system. For example, of 
the $500m community benefits for LAX expansion, $230m was for soundproofing local 
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schools and homes. Been (2010) compiles a valuable legal and policy critique of the 
evolving US approach  concluding, inter alia, that ‘local governments should reject any 
considerations of CBAs in the land use approval process or recognise only those CBAs 
that meet both substantive and procedural standards designed to limit their potential 
threats’. 
 
Elsewhere, and especially for energy projects, Denmark provides an example of where 
the government has taken steps to provide subsidies to those local areas which take 
renewable projects where the positive external benefits accrue on a national or global 
rather than local stage (Cass et al 2010). France has used community benefits over 
several decades as a form of compensation in relation to its Grand Chantiers 
programme, in particular in relation to the EDF nuclear power station programme. The 
alleged level of CBA funding for local communities varies from 1%-10% of project value, 
for a wide range of activities, and especially for affordable housing. In relation to the 
other end of the nuclear power cycle, the EU’s COWAM research programme on the 
management of radioactive waste has produced some valuable findings on the use of 
community benefits and support packages (COWAM 2009). The research findings note 
that:  
All around the world an important safeguard generally offered to potential host 
communities (however such a community is defined) is that the community should not 
find itself worse off than before the process to site a radioactive waste management 
facility began. This in turn led to the development of a number of so-called ‘impact 
mitigation’ measures. Not least amongst these has been the offering of specific benefits 
packages to the community, by way of compensation, not necessarily for bearing an 
increased risk, but simply for allowing itself to be considered. It is now generally the 
case that such benefits comprise a mixture of the purely financial and measures 
designed to assist the community to take part and ensure enhanced well-being beyond 
the lifetime of the facility in question.  
There is increasing evidence that benefit packages are being designed as integrated 
development instruments intended to not only support a community during the initial 
stages and through facility operation, but also into the long-term future, with special 
reference to the welfare of future generations. 
Some UK energy project experience  
The wind energy industry has been at the forefront in the development of community 
benefits agreements in the UK. A 2007 report on the topic (Centre for Sustainable 
Energy, 2007), outlined a range of justifications for such benefits, including: being a 
good neighbour in terms of engaging with the host community; paying compensation for 
impacts on local amenity and the inconvenience caused by the construction process; 
and sharing the rewards from wind as a ‘common’ which nobody owns. The report also 
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noted that, unlike housing, wind energy leaves little in the way of specific benefit for the 
locality in which it is based. More recent best practice guidance for English wind farms 
noted that community benefits are ‘an important way of sharing the value that wind 
energy can bring with the local community’ (Department of Energy and Climate Change 
(DECC) 2014a). Specifically in relation to Welsh wind farms, and Welsh energy policy, 
Cowell et al (2011) identify an important liability motive, ‘fairness requires that some 
form of reparations benefit is offered to communities affected by developments which 
are justified on a wider public interest basis.’  
An early example of a small scale community benefits agreement in another energy 
sub-sector was one in relation to the construction of the Sizewell B nuclear power 
station, completed in 1995, and still the most recent UK nuclear new build. This 
constituted a package of ‘ameliorative measures’, including many village hall 
improvement projects, in general recognition of the pressure placed on local facilities by 
the project (Glasson 2005). More recently the proposal for the new Hinkley Point C 
nuclear plant has been accompanied by a much more substantial CBA, as will be 
discussed in a subsequent section. At the time the responsible Minister, Michael Fallon, 
commented that ‘It is absolutely essential that we recognise the contributions of those 
communities that host major new energy projects’ (DECC 2016). 
Again recently, in relation to finding a site for the UK radioactive waste geological 
disposal facility (GDF), the UK government has indicated that it will provide significant   
additional community investment (a new term for CBAs) to help to maximize the 
significant economic benefits that are inherent in hosting a nationally significant 
infrastructure project, and in the community ‘providing such an essential service to the 
nation’ (DECC 2014b). The investment is seen as additional to the investment and jobs 
that a major infrastructure project of this kind will bring to an area. It is also additional to 
any agreements between the developer and communities to mitigate impacts during 
construction, for example, under Section 106 of the Town and Country Planning Act 
(TCPA) 1990. 
 
Some concluding points on a fuzzy area 
As can be seen, justification for CBAs varies considerably, between countries, project 
types and over time. In the context of UK major energy projects, the argument here is 
for a much tighter set of justifications than for those referred to in the US examples. 
Compared with many other forms of development (eg new housing or retail facilities),  
the benefits of large energy projects tend to be less concentrated in the local area and 
may be contributing to national objectives (eg on security of supply, CO2 reductions, 
and climate change policy). Such contributions to national policy objectives may of 
course also be the case, or at least partly the case, for other large projects including 
strategic transport projects (roads, rail lines and airports), and waste and water supply 
 8 
 
projects, but they are particularly marked for energy projects contributing to a national 
grid electricity supply system. As such one justification for CBAs is that they are some 
form of reparation to a host area for taking a major project in the national interest.   
A further justification relates to the issue of hard to mitigate local impacts from an 
energy project. This particularly relates to the construction stage, which for some major 
energy projects can lead to community disruption for long periods of perhaps up to 10 
years, and well beyond that for nuclear waste depositories. Whilst many impacts, such 
as on local roads and on housing markets can be mitigated, with for example the use of 
Park and Ride schemes to take commuting workers out of their cars, and purpose built 
worker campus accommodation to take in-migrant workers out of local housing markets, 
there can still be difficult to mitigate impacts on local amenity and on community life.  
At this point it should also be noted that there is scope for considerable confusion here 
on the role of CBAs in relation to other planning and management measures, as will be 
highlighted in the following sections. They are different from project designed-in 
measures which seek to minimise adverse local impacts at an early stage of planning; 
they are also different from any subsequent mitigation and enhancement measures 
which may evolve during the assessment and decision making process, such as the 
transport and housing measures noted in the previous paragraph. Planning decisions 
must be based on planning issues and material considerations; these exclude 
community benefits (ie: planning decisions should not be bought) (see Walter 2012). In 
England CBAs are also additional to S106 obligations under the 1990 TCPA (Section 75 
in Scotland’s planning legislation), which may encompass some of the mitigation 
measures. Recent government guidance on community benefits for wind farms in 
England (DECC 2014a) reinforces this point: 
These community benefits are separate from the planning process and are not relevant 
to the decision as to whether the planning application for a wind farm should be 
approved or not – i.e. they are not ‘material’ to the planning process. This means they 
should generally not be taken into account by local planning authorities when deciding 
the outcome of an application for a wind farm. 
 
4. Scale of benefits 
The scale of benefits of some international energy projects has already been noted and, 
depending on interpretation, has been quite large --- as for the EDF French nuclear 
programme. However early examples of community benefits for energy projects in the 
UK were quite small scale, and somewhat ad hoc. For example the Sizewell B 
amelioration programme totalled less than £600,000. In contrast, the recent Hinkley 
Point C proposed a substantial £128 million CBA package which is additional to the 
£100 million already pledged for infrastructure mitigation and enhancement measures 
(West Somerset Council 2016). 
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The increasing scale, and an attempt to formalise and build in some logic to the scale of 
benefits, is quite neatly summarised by the recent history of CBAs in relation to Scottish 
on-shore wind farm activity. Over the last 15 years the scale of benefits has increased 
from £1000 per MW³ size of the project over the working lifetime of the project (normally 
25 years) for early projects, to at least £5000 per MW for more recent projects (Natural 
Scotland, 2014). Thus, for a wind farm of 20MW the current annual benefit would be at 
least £100,000. In 2013 the renewable energy industry also agreed a protocol to provide 
community benefits in connection with eligible on-shore wind schemes in England of no 
less than £5000 per MW per year or benefits in kind to an equivalent value. The annual 
contribution will be index-linked and will commence within 12 months of the project 
making first commercial export of power and apply for the operational lifetime of the 
scheme (RenewableUK 2013). 
For large solar energy projects, which are becoming more numerous in the UK, the 
scale of benefits has been somewhat less than for on-shore wind farms. For example, 
for the county of Dorset in southern England, community benefit negotiations are based 
on a minimum benchmark of £1000 per MW of installed capacity per year for a period of 
20 years, index linked to the Retail Price Index (or a pro-rata single upfront community 
benefit payment). However, there is little current consistency with rates of up to £3000 
per MW for similar projects in Cornwall (Dorset CC 2015). Solar farm host locations are 
keen to learn from the Scottish on-shore wind farm experience, but are partly hindered 
by the lack of national guidance on solar farm community benefits.  
Of course when the MW scale of a modern nuclear power station, or off-shore wind 
farm, is factored in the sums can become much larger. At the 3.2 GW³ (3200 MW) 
Hinkley Point C, the annual benefits for the operational station have been agreed at 
£3.2 million (ie £1000 per MW), giving a lifetime benefits package of £128 million 
(DECC 2013). For off-shore wind farms, many of which are now very large (over 1GW 
and rising), the logic is less well developed, perhaps reflecting the out of site out of mind 
remote off-shore locations, although such projects often have substantial onshore cable 
routes connecting into sub-stations. Some, predominantly near-shore English wind 
farms (eg North Hoyle and Rhyll Flats off the north Wales coast) have followed the 
pattern of the on-shore wind farms, with benefits pro rata to MW size; but in many 
cases, and for some of the latest large North Sea distant off-shore wind farms, the 
benefits packages have to date proved to be more ad hoc and pro rata much smaller 
than for on-shore projects. However a recent £10 million CBA initiative by the Danish 
energy company Dong, in relation to its Hornsea One and Race Bank wind farms, is of 
note; a fund will distribute nearly half a million pounds a year to help local initiatives for 
each of the next 20 years (Dong 2016). A report by the University of Edinburgh on 
community benefits from offshore renewables (Rudolf et al 2014), recommends the 
avoidance of restrictive guidance for the relatively new, developing and risky by nature 
off-shore renewables industry.   
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Other recent examples of the rising scale of benefits in the UK are provided by 
approaches to the disposal of nuclear waste, and to the exploitation of shale gas 
(fracking). The UK Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) provides a Community 
Fund for each of the communities at Drigg in the Borough of Copeland, West Cumbria, 
England, and at Dounreay in Caithness, Scotland, both of which have storage facilities 
for low level nuclear waste. For example, at Drigg, the NDA contribution is an initial 
amount of £10 million at the commencement of a project providing an additional 
disposal vault at a long established facility, plus £1.5 million each year for the estimated 
10 years of operation (NDA 2015). Section 6 of the paper outlines the management of 
the Copeland Community Fund.  
However, in relation to the proposed much larger scale UK high level radioactive waste 
geological disposal facility (GDF), uncertainty of the nature and scale of community 
benefits was one of the factors which led Cumbria County Council to reject in 2013 
moving to the next stage of the site search process. This led to a government review of 
its approach to the GDF, including community benefits. In the resultant White Paper 
(DECC 2014), the Government has committed to significant community investment, 
comparable to other international GDF projects. It also introduced a multi-stage element 
to the funding, to support communities that volunteered to engage with the process, and 
reflecting the long time scale involved in planning and developing such a facility:  
Community investment of up to £1m per involved community, per year, will be made 
available in the early stages of the siting process. This amount of community investment 
would rise to up to £2.5m per year for the community (or communities) that progresses 
to the stage of intrusive, borehole investigations to assess a potentially suitable site (or 
sites).This funding would only continue for as long as the community remained engaged 
in the process. 
If and when a final community was chosen, and agreed to be the host location for the 
GDF, a more substantial CBA package would follow. 
A range of community benefits has also been proposed in relation to the potential, and 
very controversial, introduction of shale gas exploitation in the UK. The benefits include 
the provision for local councils to keep all business rates paid by developers, and for 
energy firms to make direct payments to local residents and to set up trust funds to be 
managed by local communities. The energy industry also announced further community 
benefits of £100,000 per well site when a test well is drilled, plus 1% of the share of 
revenues from any resultant gas production (Department for Business, Energy and 
Industrial Strategy, 2016; Finlayson et al 2016). 
 
5. Types of benefits 
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Community benefits for energy projects can come in various forms. A summary listing 
which applies to many types of energy project, and which was set out in some detail in 
the 2009 EU COWAM report on the management of radioactive waste, includes the 
following three broad categories: 
 financial incentives: an annual payment or lump sum or both; share in local tax 
revenues; discounts in terms of reduced utility fees; and equity shareholding or 
profit sharing with the local community, for example in a renewable energy 
project or gift shares into the ownership of a local community organisation; 
 social benefits in kind where a developer may provide for a community facility or 
local environmental improvements: a widening range including transport 
improvements over and above those needed for a development to proceed, 
affordable housing, training/apprenticeship schemes, village halls, sports 
facilities, improved telecoms etc; and  
 community empowerment measures: with local participation in decision making 
and/or ongoing monitoring, and local capacity building. 
 
Recent government guidance on community benefits for wind farms in England (DECC 
2014a) has a similar listing with two main categories (see Table 1). Social benefits are 
also increasingly being used to enhance local wellbeing, particularly in relation to actual 
and perceived health, safety, crime and relative deprivation issues (Chadwick and 
Glasson 2017). The various types of benefits have their advantages and disadvantages. 
For example, although lump sum financial incentives may bring immediate benefits for 
communities, the community may demand more for continued involvement. Annual 
payments can demonstrate a long term commitment by a developer and allow a 
community to assess the benefits of participation over time, but they could encourage a 
community dependency culture. In terms of social benefits in kind, infrastructure 
improvements have the advantage of being highly visible to the local population, but 
there may be some local opposition (for example to new transport projects), and they 
may provide an opportunity for local and central government to cut down on their own 
investments in the community. 
Owning a share in an energy project is another way in which an individual or group can 
benefit. This approach has been utilised for some renewables projects in the UK; but, 
with less than 10% locally owned and more than 90% owned by the big energy 
companies, the UK is well behind some EU countries such as Denmark and Germany. 
In Denmark for example, under the 2008 Renewable Energy Act, developers must offer 
up to 20% of shares in a project to individual households living within 4.5 km radius of 
the site; any shares not taken up are then offered to other householders in the wider 
municipality (Meacham 2012). Strachan et al (2015) also note the dominance of major 
projects and large corporations in the UK, although believe that there is some scope for 
community renewables via joint ownership.  
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The value of community empowerment measures is emphasised by many authors. For 
example, with regard to the management of radioactive waste, European Commission 
research (Argona 2010) sees such measures as a way of allowing a community ‘to feel 
a sense of control over the siting, development and even operation of the project’. A 
very interesting example of community engagement is provided by the activities of the 
West Cumbria Managing Radioactive Waste Safely partnership in the UK. This was set 
up to ensure a wide range of community interests were involved in the discussion of 
issues around the potential siting of a geological disposal facility in West Cumbria (West 
Cumbria MRWS 2012). Funded by a central government ‘engagement package’, but 
with a largely local agency membership independent from central government, the 
partnership employed a range of public and stakeholder engagement measures to 
explore public concerns and to get feedback on key issues. One element of the 
partnership work resulted in the clarification of a set of principles to be applied to any 
future community benefits agreement, including for example ‘any benefits must deliver 
both short and long-term community well-being for West Cumbria as a whole’; ‘the 
magnitude of benefits must bear a clear relationship to the overall scale, nature and 
national significance of the development’.  
Table 1 here 
In practice, there is often an integrated package of measures including several aspects 
of the various types outlined. Also some constraints may be imposed on the type and 
mix of benefits. Cass et al (2010) note a strong community preference in many cases 
for the benefit of cheap energy, but this can be severely constrained by both technical 
and regulatory obstacles. However, experiences in some other EU countries appear 
better than in the UK on this measure (Strachan et al, 2010), and there are some UK 
initiatives (RES 2015). There may be other steers; for example in a toolkit for delivering 
benefits from wind energy projects, the UK Renewables Advisory Board (2009) 
advocates benefits which provide gains for the community as a whole, and which are 
linked to sustainable energy (Table 2). Cowell et al (2012) also note a case for using 
some of the community benefits from wind farm developments to support local 
ownership of renewable energy, thereby potentially delivering a higher level of local 
benefits and local resilience. 
Table 2 here 
 
6. Management of benefits 
 
How and by whom community benefits are managed in practice can be a contentious 
issue. Large sums of money over a long timescale can be involved, and issues of 
fairness and accountability are important. Some researchers (see for example Kojo and 
Richardson 2013) have drawn attention to a distinction in approach which applies not 
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only to the management of benefits, but also to the scale and types involved. A legally 
imposed approach is one where the scale, type and preconditions of benefits are largely 
determined beforehand in legislation; in contrast, a locally-negotiated approach involves 
negotiation between the key players at the local level without a legislative framework, 
followed by some form of formal agreement between the negotiating parties. Much of 
the guidance and the toolkits already noted, support a strong role for local negotiation, 
with developers encouraged to engage openly with local communities to assess their 
needs, benefits models and potential beneficiary communities.  In practice there may 
also be some combination of approaches, with a framework set by national legislation or 
guidance, but still with some scope for local negotiation. A framework approach may 
also be set at a more regional level. It may also be set by the industry itself, as 
exemplified by the protocol on community benefits developed by Renewable UK (‘the 
voice of wind and marine energy’) in 2013 in relation to on-shore wind farms in England 
of 5MW and above. 
 
Local negotiation does raise the issue of who represents the community, and the role of 
local government and local politicians. In practice this can lead to a choice between 
either working through existing local councils or setting up new organisations, such as a 
Community Trust Fund, to manage the CBA process. Important here is the degree of 
community confidence in local politicians and officers to operate impartially, 
representing all the community and not just the decision making authorities. Cowell et al 
(2011), from their research in Wales, highlight examples of considerable scepticism of 
local people with regard to the capacity of local authorities to manage the process in the 
best interests of the relevant communities. There are pros and cons to the various 
management models, as set out in Table 3 which relates to a toolkit for wind energy 
development in the UK (CSE 2009). Where a CBA is managed through the local 
authority, there may be merit in the use of a role such as a local authority Developer 
Contributions Officer, which is clearly separate from the local authority planning 
function. It is also reasonable to assume that developers will have an interest as to how 
the funds they are providing are being managed.  
 
Table 3 here  
 
An example of a management approach is provided by the previously noted Copeland 
Community Fund (CCF), which was established in 2008 in relation to the storage of low 
level radioactive waste near the village of Drigg in West Cumbria. The Fund is managed 
by a Project Board, set up under a legal agreement between the Nuclear 
Decommissioning Authority (NDA) and the relevant local authorities. The seven 
members of the board are: the Leader and Opposition Leader of Copeland local 
authority (host area), two members of Cumbria County Council (host region), one 
member of the NDA (fund provider) and two independent members (appointed after 
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public invitation). The objectives of the CCF are to make grants and loans and to 
support activities which promote the social, economic and environmental wellbeing of 
the inhabitants and area of Copeland. Likely projects for support include employment, 
education and skills, economic and social infrastructure and economic diversification 
(NDA 2015). 
 
 
7. Distribution of benefits 
 
The distribution of community benefits can also be contentious and management bodies 
need to operate in a fair and transparent way. A key issue is what is the relevant 
community? Walker (2011) sets out a range of ways in which this appealing term of 
‘community’ has been defined in relation to carbon reduction projects. These include: 
actor, scale of activity, spatial setting, form of network, and a type of process through 
which carbon reduction objectives can be implemented. In practice, there may be some 
combination of the various approaches to those criteria to be used in relation to 
identifying the community for benefits distribution, and also for involvement in the 
management of the process. These can include, for example: proximity to the 
development, the degree of received nuisance such as visual impacts (including 
identification of Zones of Theoretical Visibility [ZTVs] which may not always be directly 
related to distance) and from construction stage traffic, and local population density. 
Applying information on such criteria may not be straightforward and simpler 
administrative solutions might be used relating to local authority areas. For example, 
where development impacts straddle several authority areas, then benefits may be 
allocated amongst them perhaps on a population pro rata basis. The complexity in 
defining 'community' and indeed 'stakeholders' in an offshore context, in comparison 
with the onshore context, should be noted in particular and this might partly explain the 
still limited application of a CBA approach for offshore wind projects. 
 
However a predisposition in favour of a local distribution of benefits may be contentious 
in many ways, especially where the development has associated linear infrastructure, 
such as power lines and rail links. It may also be contentious in terms of perceived 
equity of opportunity to benefit from major energy projects.  Multiple models have been 
used for splitting payments between local and wider areas for on-shore wind farms in 
Scotland (Highland Council 2014; Meacham 2012, and Scottish and Southern Energy 
2012). The Highland Council also includes a policy variation for off-shore wind, with 
20% of the benefit realised going to coastal communities, and the remaining 80% going 
to a Highland Trust Fund. 
 
A particularly interesting case of a distribution approach is provided by Dumfries and 
Galloway Regional Council in SW Scotland. In 2005 the Council agreed a Wind Farms 
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Community Benefit Governance Framework which, amongst other things, established a 
two tier approach to the distribution of benefits. Under the governance framework: 
 
60% of the Community Benefit funds from any one wind farm go to the 15km 
communities (within 15km of outer edge of the wind farm) and 40% will go into a region-
wide fund ring-fenced for renewable energy or energy efficiency projects. This fund can 
be bid into by any Community Council. The 40% region-wide fund is designed to ensure 
that some of the funding is spread to as many communities as possible, to give impetus 
to the national drive towards better energy efficiency and greater use of renewables as 
an energy source. The 40% fund is also in-line with developers’ wishes to target spend 
towards renewables and  energy efficiency and therefore its existence and use may 
advantage further funding from developers for communities developing suitable projects 
(Dumfries and Galloway Council 2005). 
 
The local/regional mix was subsequently amended to 50:50 (Dumfries and Galloway 
Regional Council 2011). But the policy was nothing but controversial with those 
communities hosting wind farms seeing the 50% regional fund contribution being taken 
away from them, leading to a sometimes adversarial situation between the communities 
and the Regional Council. The outcome was that in 2015 the Council in its Draft 
Updated Windfarm Community Benefit Guidelines (Dumfries and Galloway Regional 
Council 2015) proposed the removal of the 50:50 split and the 15km measurement of 
host communities. It did also propose the retention of a region-wide fund but only to 
handle any voluntary payments made by developers or communities. In similar vein to 
this Scottish example, Cowell et al (2011) note for their Welsh study that ‘in general, any 
redistribution of community benefits was seen as diluting the prime function of 
community benefits which was to atone for the impacts on the nearest communities.’ 
 
The contentious nature of distribution has also been highlighted in England with the 
recent debate on payments to communities where fracking for shale gas may take 
place. Official policy on community benefits is set out in a Department for Business, 
Energy and Industrial Strategy document (DBEIS 2016) as noted in section 4 above. It 
is amplified in an industry publication by the UK Onshore Operators Group (UKOOG 
2016), which also advocates a two-tier approach for some of the community benefits, 
with 1% of revenues at production stage allocated approximately 2/3rd to the local 
community and 1/3rd at the county level. Issues of distributive justice associated with 
this proposed approach are set out by Cotton (2016); for example would individuals in a 
rural authority receive much higher per capita benefits than those in more densely 
populated urban/peri-urban communities? Research by Szolucha (2015) on the case of 
potential fracking in Lancashire noted, amongst many other local concerns, that 
compensation to landowners was viewed as a way to “overcome local resistance and 
could potentially constitute a socially divisive conduct by the company”. 
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Another issue on distribution relates to when benefits are distributed. This partly relates 
to the timing of any agreement on community benefits. Early agreement on the nature of 
community benefits in the planning and decision making process may be helpful in 
terms of providing the community with early benefits. However it also runs the risk of 
being perceived as an element in the decision (i.e. buying planning permission). As 
such some commentators advise that the timing of agreements, and any associated 
distribution of benefits, should follow the decision on the planning permission. There 
may also be merits in the staging of payments, perhaps related to project milestones, as 
noted earlier. 
 
8. Conclusions 
 
Community benefit agreements have grown in significance over the last 15 years in 
relation to UK energy projects. On-shore wind projects pioneered many of the 
approaches to the key issues discussed in this article. But the scope of relevant energy 
projects is much wider than on-shore wind. There is the growing phenomenon of off-
shore wind, with projects often on a much larger scale than on-shore, plus other 
renewables including solar arrays, and emerging technologies such as tidal barrages 
and tidal streaming. In addition there are fossil–fuelled projects (most recently CCGT), 
new nuclear build and nuclear waste disposal, and the proposals for the fracking of 
shale gas. The CBA approach is progressing in most of these areas; it is likely that it is 
here to stay and widen in coverage to other energy project types, including the new 
technologies. Government does appear to be committed to making community benefits 
a norm across all energy technologies. 
On-shore wind has provided useful models for CBAs in the wider energy sector, in 
relation to size, type, management and distribution of community benefits. There is also 
now much good practice guidance available for on-shore wind, including a move to 
some formalisation of approaches with regard to the issues raised. Ironically this comes 
at a time when, at least for England, there is declining government policy support for on-
shore wind projects. Other energy sub-sectors can and do draw on this evolving 
practice. For smaller projects, including on-shore wind farms and solar arrays, there 
may also be some shift in the mix of benefits, with some move away from financial 
payments towards shared ownership and cheaper fuel tariffs (Dorset CC 2015). For 
example, Renewable Energy Systems (RES) is introducing local electricity discount 
schemes (LEDs) for some Scottish Wind farms (RES 2015). 
However, the scale of some of the major projects now coming through, including those 
for nuclear power generation, nuclear waste disposal, and off-shore wind, raises some 
comparative issues, for example about the scale of benefits and about management 
models. Distributional equity arguments might suggest the case for an even-handed, 
more formalised, approach across energy sub-sectors, and there are rising expectations 
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by communities about what might be appropriate. On the other hand developers, 
especially in new technology areas, argue for more flexibility in the nature of CBAs to 
allow for the technical and policy vagaries associated with bringing new projects to 
market (Rudolf et al 2014).  
Community benefits are often very sensitive issues in communities. Perspectives on 
such benefits vary; for some they are bribes to take forward a project, unwanted for 
various reasons, while for others they are an appropriate sharing in the rewards of a 
development, and provide appropriate reparations. Community understanding can be 
aided by good practice guidance, representative management and fair distribution in the 
CBA process. Good guidance emphasises community empowerment in a flexible CBA 
process, as illustrated for example in the partnership approaches used in relation to 
nuclear waste management in West Cumbria. This is also generally welcomed by 
developers, although the very formalisation of the guidance can potentially constrain 
such empowerment and flexibility. Overall however, as noted by Cass et al (2010), 
reinforced by Walter (2012), planning decisions linked to localised benefits are 
intrinsically sensitive and political, and are likely to continue so.  
The discussion on justification also highlights the need to be clear on the relationship of 
CBAs with environmental assessment procedures and the planning process. CBAs are 
separate to the normal project impact mitigation and enhancement measures 
associated with the environmental assessment of projects. They are also outwith 
planning decisions, which must be based on planning issues and material 
considerations. As noted, CBAs are also additional to S106 obligations under the 1990 
TCPA. Research suggests that these distinctions are not always clear to the various 
participants involved in the process (Cass et al 2010; Cowell et al 2011), and it is a 
‘shadowy area’ (CSE 2005). 
The paper has highlighted a number of issues, which contribute to a continuing 
fuzziness, certainly for energy projects in the UK. Whilst the conclusion is that CBAs are 
likely to be here for the foreseeable future, they do need to be handled sensitively and 
with some flexibility across the various energy technologies.   
 
Acknowledgements 
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Annual UK Planning Schools Research 
Conference held at Oxford Brookes University in September 2014. The author is grateful to the 
audience for their comments at the conference. The comments of two referees are also very 
gratefully acknowledged. 
Notes 
¹ Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), Social Impact Assessment (SIA), Strategic 
Environmental Assessment (SEA), Sustainability Appraisal (SA), Health Impacts Assessment 
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(HIA), Habitats Regulation Assessment (HRA), Equality Impact Assessment (EqIA) ---and many 
more. 
² This abbreviation is useful and used, but the reader should avoid confusion with Cost Benefit 
Analysis!   
³1 Megawatt (MW) equals 1,000 Kilowatts (KW). 1 Gigawatt (GW) equals 1,000 MW. 
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